Pakistan at the Threshold of the 21st Century: How to Shape a Better Economic Future? by Pervez Hasan
The Pakistan Development Review 
37 : 4 Part I (Winter 1998) pp. 37:4, 85–122 
 
 
The Mahbub ul Haq Memorial Lecture 
 
Pakistan at the Threshold of the 21st Century:  




Pakistan has been facing a deep-seated economic and financial crisis and seemingly 
intractable governance issues for the last few years. Factors such as international sanctions and 
global economic slowdown, which have worsened Pakistan’s economic difficulties, were 
beyond Pakistan’s control. But by and large, the country’s economic and financial difficulties 
are the result of economic mismanagement in key areas over long periods. Bad governance, as 
reflected in widespread corruption and poor delivery of public services, and especially poor law 
and order have given birth to a crisis of confidence in the state. It is argued here that despite this 
scenario, a long and arduous process of building institutions, setting the policies right, and 
enforcing a rule-based governance stressing both merit and accountability can put Pakistan 
back on the road to shared prosperity. Resolving financial problems, accelerating demographic 
transition, exploiting tremendous agricultural potential, improving both availability and quality 
of education, increasing competitiveness and bringing about structural change in exports and 
industry, and reforming the government are crucial policy actions that can help shape a better 
future for the country and end the economic drift. 
 
It is a great honour to be asked to give the first Mahbub ul Haq memorial lecture 
to The Pakistan Society of Development Economists. Mahbub’s sudden and untimely 
death in the summer of 1998 is still a source of great shock. His passing away has 
deprived Pakistan of one of its most illustrious sons and robbed the world community of 
one of the most effective spokesmen for just development. Mahbub’s path breaking 
contributions to the concept of human development will be long remembered and his 
influence on economic and social policies is being felt globally. For me Mahbub was a 
close personal friend for nearly half a century. It was also a source of great pleasure to 
work closely with him in Pakistan’s planning in the 1960s and at the World Bank in the 
1970s and to see him operate with such boldness and conviction in dealing with issues of 
poverty. For all his internationalism, Mahbub’s first and lasting love was Pakistan. I 
know that he was frustrated and troubled that Pakistan’s economic and social 
performance had not lived up to the earlier promise and had fallen much short of the very 
considerable potential. In honouring Mahbub ul Haq’s memory, therefore, I will devote 
my lecture to conditions and policies which are needed for an economic turnaround in 
Pakistan. I believe better governance and more effective economic management can 
ensure not only higher growth than in the past but more just distribution of growth 
benefits, a broader human development and greater self reliance.   
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PRESENT POSITION 
There can be little argument that Pakistan has been facing a deep seated 
economic and financial crisis and seemingly intractable governance issues for the last 
few years. The financial crisis manifested itself in a near default on external loans in 
1996-97, freezing of resident foreign currency deposits in late May 1998, and a 
technical default on many external debt payment after August 1998, latter triggered by 
imposition of sanctions following India and Pakistan’s nuclear explosions. A new IMF 
agreement and agreement by the Paris and London clubs to reschedule substantial 
amount of debt payments due in 1998-99 and possibly in 1999-2000 has staved off 
danger of debt default but there is a consensus that these agreements have provided 
breathing room only. The macro-economic imbalances, both fiscal and external still 
remain rather large.  The overhang of public debt is how huge. By mid 1999 the ratio of 
public debt to GDP was over 95 percent (the comparable figures for India is 55 percent) 
and any significant reduction of debt burden will require a combination of strong 
financial discipline and good economic policies stretched over several years. Meanwhile 
the financial constraint is aggravating the structural economic problems notably in 
industry and exports and is depressing investment in physical and human capital so 
badly needed to rectify Pakistan’s serious lag, in infrastructure and social development. 
In 1998-99 both public investment and total fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP were at the lowest level in more than two decades: total investment was only 14.9 
percent of GDP in 1998-99 compared to the average of 18.8 percent during 1990–98. It 
is hardly surprising that the per capita GNP growth which had already slowed to 1.1 
percent annum during the first half of the 1990’s from over 3 percent per annum during 
1960–90 has nearly stagnated during the last three years. 
The governance issue are highlighted by the crisis of confidence in the state 
which is resulting from poor delivery of public services especially law and order. This 
along with wide spread corruption is leading to a breakdown of the compact between the 
people and the state. This makes it difficult among other things to collect taxes. At the 
political level, the divisions in the country remain large notwithstanding the 
unprecedented political mandate given to Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League in February 
1997 and notwithstanding the large majority of the government in the Parliament. 
Indeed, the Government’s standing in the smaller provinces has suffered as it lost its 
coalition partners ANP and MQM . There is a sense that politics are being dominated by 
the Punjab and the Prime Minister’s inner circle. 
From a geo-political point of view, the fact that Pakistan has gone from being the 
best performing country on the sub-continent in terms of growth rate of GNP per capita 
during 1960–85 to the worst in the 1990s is bound to have consequences for handling of 
foreign policy and defence issues.  In per capita GNP terms, India now seems to be 
growing three to four times as fast as Pakistan.  This is bound to upset the balance of 
power considered so vital in South Asia. Thus notwithstanding Pakistan’s acquisition of 
the nuclear capability, the strategic edge seems to belong to India. Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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On the external side, the crisis in East Asia, subsequent large devaluations of East 
Asian Currencies, prospect of slowdown in global economic growth, sharp curtailment in 
availability of international capital flows to the not so strong borrowers has also adversely 
effected Pakistan’s exports and the balance of payments position. Finally the 
deterioration in the climate for foreign private investment in Pakistan due to the dispute 
with IPPs (Independent Power Producers) has also clouded economic outlook. Clearly 
some of the factors which have deepened Pakistan’s economic difficulties i.e. 
international sanctions and global economic slowdown were beyond Pakistan’s control.  
But by and large, the country’s economic and financial difficulties have been building up 
over decades and are the result of economic mismanagement in key areas over long 
periods. For instance successive government downplayed the need for more self reliant 
growth, tended to ignore the growing competition between defence and development, 
invested inadequately in social and human capital and in making economic choices often 
opted for the easier short term solutions. Unfortunately, the present political and 
economic leadership has been no exception. It has not recognised the serious bind in 
which the past policies have placed Pakistan and the time it will take to put the economy 
on a sound footing. It has not taken the public into confidence about the tough choices the 
country faces and thus it has not sought to develop a truly national consensus on key 
issues such as savings, exports, population control, education, the role of government and 
the relations with India. It has instead held out prospects for quick and relatively painless 
recovery. 
 
POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES 
Let me elaborate on the policy and the institutional failures. Some policy 
problems have persisted over decades.  Excessive reliance on foreign capital, low 
domestic savings, inadequate investment in the social sectors and heavy protection to 
domestic industry, can all be traced back to the 1960s, otherwise considered a golden 
era of development. The 1970 nationalisations by Bhutto of a segment of industry, 
banking, insurance and private educational institutions dealt a major blow to the 
emerging private sector and even twenty five years later large part of the financial and 
insurance sectors are still owned by the public sector. At the same time, following the 
separation of East Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh, defence spending was 
increased and large fiscal deficits began to be incurred. Under Zia, none of the difficult 
policy issues which had emerged during the 1960s and the 1970s, unsustainable fiscal 
deficits, lag in social development, unbalanced industrial development were tackled 
resolutely. Indeed defence spending accelerated sharply and development spending was 
squeezed seriously upsetting the balance between the two. 
After ten years of democracy following Zia, macro-economic adjustment still 
remains incomplete, the relative allocations between defence and development have 
become even more unbalanced and progress towards universal primary education and 
adult literacy remains limited. While there has been an important policy shift towards Parvez Hasan  37:4, 88 
the private sector and greater reliance on market signals rather than administered prices, 
the privatisation efforts have made limited head way and the losses of the large public 
enterprises notably WAPDA have grown. The response of the domestic private sector to 
the liberalisation of foreign exchange and investment controls has been very inadequate. 
In face of the challenges of resource mobilisation, export development and structural 
changes in the industrial sector, private sector has been floundering. Indeed the relative 
dependence of the private sector on borrowing has grown and the textile industry has 
found it difficult to cope with the phasing out of the subsidies on raw cotton. As the 
export taxation of cotton, which had provided a strong but unnecessary cushion to the 
profitability of the Pakistan textile industry for several decades was phased out, cotton 
based exports have stagnated in the 1990s pulling down the entire export performance 
because of their dominant weight in total exports. 
Two biggest failures of public policy and institutions during the last ten years 
have been the sharp deterioration in the effectiveness of resource use in the public sector 
and the growing abuses in the largely public sector controlled financial system.  Over 
the period 1990–98, real public spending, excluding interest payments, actually 
declined. But the problems arising from shortages of public sector resources for 
development were made worse by the way public sector programme was managed in 
the post-Zia period. The effectiveness of public sector development and non-
development suffered because political pressures in the choice of projects and 
implementation arrangements became quite overt, the institutional capacity for review 
and appraisal of projects was further weakened and diffused, and the economic policy 
coordination arrangements for setting economic priorities tended to be bypassed. The 
institutional capability of Pakistan’s planing institutions, especially the Planning 
Commission, was in decline for a long time, but the decisions to bypass the Planning 
Commission’s approval process for important programmes, such as highways and 
energy development and politically-motivated development like the People’s Work 
Programme, were extremely unfortunate. All democratic governments, starting with 
Junejo’s in 1985, found have it difficult to resist political pressures from regional and 
local interests for low priority public spending. The ad hoc nature of decision-making 
appeared, however, to reach its nadir during Benazir Bhutto’s second administration 
(1993–96) and proved particularly costly in terms of its macro-economic consequences. 
That prime minister Benazir Bhutto also was the finance minister contributed to diluting 
the force of internal procedures and processes. 
Some tightening of public spending has taken place during the last two years. 
The problems with leakages in government spending have continued to persist, 
however, as demonstrated by wide spread abuses such as ghost schools and phantom 
teachers. Also, decisions on many development projects continue to be made on an ad 
hoc basis. Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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The further deterioration in the health of the domestic banking system is reflected 
in the rise in overdue and bad loans from Rs 80 billion or about 25 percent of 
outstanding loans in August 1993 to Rs 143 billion or about one-third of total 
outstanding loans in 1998. That the highest default ratio occurred in the case of 
nationalised banks suggests both greater inefficiencies in public sector owned banks and 
their greater  susceptibility to political pressures and corrupt practices. 
The present government in its first two years has certainly been able to reign in 
corruption at the higher levels of government, has reduced government administrative 
spending, and, as mentioned above, made some progress in improving the effectiveness 
of spending. It has, by and large reaffirmed support for the liberal economic policies, 
speedy privatisation and major financial sector reform though the actual progress on 
privatisation of public enterprises and public owned banks remains painfully slow. But it 
has also made major economic policy mistakes and has not en begun the difficult task of 
rebuilding public institutions for development. 
 
THREE RECENT POLICY MISTAKES 
Among the policy mistakes three that stand out are, the timing of the tax reform, 
and the handling of the resident foreign currency deposits and the IPPs. The not well 
thought out major reduction in income tax, sales tax and customs duty rates in March 
1997 led to a decline in the already low ratio of tax to GDP to 13 percent in 1997-98 
notwithstanding the windfall in form of higher taxes on petroleum reflecting lower 
international oil prices. The expectations that low income tax rates will lead to an 
enlargement of the base of tax payers and that lower trade taxes will reduce smuggling 
have not materialised. The basic philosophy of extending the base of taxation and 
reducing the immense tax leakage and evasion through a more moderate level of 
taxation might have been sound but the timing and sequencing of tax reform measures 
was wrong. The loss of revenue is estimated at  about 1.5 percent of GDP. The second 
mistake was to resist the needed up front devaluation following the imposition of 
economic sanctions and the deterioration in the foreign exchange position in May 1997 
and instead to opt for the freezing of resident foreign currency deposits to  forestall  a 
run on these deposits. Eight months later, the government found itself in the worst of all 
possible worlds, a large de-facto devaluation, a critical loss of trust in its ability to 
honour commitments, and a surrender  to the demands of the holders of the deposits to 
convert them to foreign exchange obligations albeit medium term bonds with a 
minimum maturity of three years. Similarly the handling of the disputes with the IPPs 
has left much to be desired. While the allegedly serious corruption  by the IPPs had to be 
investigated, the high profile fashion in which the government has gone about it has 
seriously damaged the foreign investment climate in Pakistan. 
It is not surprising that the persistent weaknesses in investment, policies and Parvez Hasan  37:4, 90 
institutions have resulted in  a growth crisis.  There is a growth crisis in the sense that 
significant increases in the per capita income which were enjoyed for long periods can 
no longer be taken for granted. The unsustainability of the past pattern of Pakistan’s 
development with its excessive reliance on foreign resources, neglect of human 
development and equity issues is patently clear. That we have lost economic momentum 
in relation to both India and Bangladesh is also sadly true. 
In short, there cannot be too much dispute that Pakistan at the threshold of the 
21st century finds itself in deep economic and political trouble. Under the 
circumstances it is not easy to reflect on the economic future and certainly 
impossible to predict it. But depth of the present crisis and the widespread pessimism 
about the future can and must provide the seeds of positive thinking. I will argue that 
since most of the Pakistan economic problems are the result of economic 
mismanagement and poor governance setting the policies right and starting the long 
and arduous process of building back institutions, enforcing a rule based governance, 
stressing both merit and accountability, can put Pakistan on the road to shared 
prosperity. After a painful period of adjustment and transition lasting perhaps three 
to five years Pakistan can recover to healthy average rates of per capita GNP growth 
and unlike the past combine it with a broader distribution of growth benefits and 
strong progress towards human development. 
 
NEED TO DEVELOP A LONG TERM VISION 
Indeed one can go further and present the hypothesis that with improved political 
governance and moderately good economic management, Pakistan can have a much 
better economic and social record during the next twenty five years  than in the past 
quarter or half century. But one must hasten to add that in retrospect the  overall 
economic performance in the past cannot be considered very satisfactory. Contrary to 
general impressions, even on the narrow criteria of per capita GNP growth,  Pakistan’s 
increase of 2.1 percent per annum over 1973–98 was about average  in South Asia. On  
many other measures of performance i.e. human development, structural change 
(especially development of new dynamic exports  and a  modern industrial sector), 
domestic savings, self reliance, and avoidance of external debt difficulties, Pakistan’s 
record does not compare favourably with  either India or Bangladesh. In my judgement, 
it will be feasible for Pakistan to attain an average GNP per capita growth of 4 percent 
per annum during the next twenty five years double the 2 percent per annum growth 
achieved during the last fifty years. More importantly, higher growth with broader 
distribution of growth benefits and greater self reliance will be possible if development 
strategy emphasises savings, exports, human development and agricultural and 
industrial modernisation and de-emphasises rent seeking and makes the tax and 
expenditure system both more effective and fairer. Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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To sum, the long term target of 4 percent per capita GNP growth may appear too 
modest and inconsistent with the desire to join the ranks of  Asian Tigers in economic 
performance. Here two points are relevant. First, the past neglect of investment in 
human capital and low levels of educational attainment  in Pakistan will continue to 
constrain growth for quite sometime especially in the present circumstances where 
growth in productivity as well as expansion in international trade  is increasingly related 
to knowledge based advances in information technology. Pakistan cannot easily emulate 
countries like Korea and Malaysia because these countries had already in  the 1960s or 
the 1970s  attained educational standards higher than Pakistan enjoys to-day.  In Korea 
essentially full enrolment at the primary level was achieved in the early 1960s. By 1975 
three fourth of the relevant age group was completing middle school [Hasan and Rao 
(1979)]. In Malaysia  primary  level enrolment was 90 percent in 1974 and secondary 
level enrolment was 40 percent [Young, Bussink and Hasan (1980)]. In Pakistan 
universal primary enrolment could take another decade.
1 At present, the mean years of 
schooling of workers aged 25 and over is only around 2.5.
2 Second, even with good 
policies and strong political determination, the  acceleration of growth from the present 
level of  barely 1 per capita per annum will take time. The recovery from the present 
economic crisis, in growth terms, cannot be quick if due attention is to be given to 
putting finances in order, shifting the focus of investment towards the social sectors and 
restructuring industry to face the competitive pressures of globalisation. 
The main point is that in Pakistan’s context where the past pattern of 
development has proven to be totally unsustainable because of its extraordinary 
dependence on foreign savings and its inequitable sharing of growth benefits, a longer 
run economic vision is absolutely necessary. This vision should concern itself not only 
with growth but also equity and greater financial self reliance. Unless long term goals 
are defined in these broader terms, short term costs, trade offs and sacrifices  will not be 
either understood or  accepted. A twenty five year  time horizon might be anathema to 
most politicians but hopefully public opinion and the private sector can be persuaded to 
take the long view  instead of considering our present predicament hopeless? I recognise  
that Keynes said that in the long run we are all dead but his context was not development 
and structural change in  a pre-modern society. Pakistan’s problems are deep seated and 
the government undermines its own credibility when it promises a quick recovery  in 
growth and a relatively quick resolution of structural and financial issues. While the 
general directions of change suggested in the programme Pakistan 2010 make sense, the 
growth, savings and investment targets indicated are totally unrealistic. For instance, 
1The government has set an ambitious target of universal primary education by the year 2006. But 
this target is likely to be missed not so much because of financial difficulties but rather institutional 
capacity and managerial constraints. 
2Pakistan (1997-98). The male and female data has been combined using their ratio in the labour 
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Pakistan 2010 implies a target of nearly 8 percent per annum GDP growth over the next 
decade or so against the actual growth of 3.7 percent per annum during 1993–98. This 
kind of framework not only raises unrealistic expectations but also distorts likely 
resource availability and investment priorities. Realism and patience are qualities both 
our politicians and planners will need in great measure at least for the next Plan period 
(1998–2003) which will at best be a period of adjustment and transition. 
 
CONDITIONS FOR AN ECONOMIC TURNAROUND 
I think  I have said enough to indicate that in aiming to treble per capita GNP 
over the next twenty five to thirty years and to achieve this with greater equity and more 
financial self reliance, the sights are not being set too low.
3 But while the goals are not 
unambitious, their achievement will require clearly better political governance than seen 
in the last decade, a much more forceful pursuit of necessary economic adjustments and 
much greater attention to institutional reforms and implementation issues. 
A strong, enlightened and honest  political leadership which can build a national 
consensus not only on economic priorities but also on the more difficult issues of 
relations with India, the priority of defence spending , and power sharing arrangements 
with the provinces  is vital for better economic performance. The record of democracy 
in Pakistan during the last decade is not an encouraging one. But one hopes that the 
present leadership will learn from its mistakes, not ignore professional advice and have 
the political will to stay the course of unpopular and painful economic decisions.  
The governance problems of deteriorating law and order, widespread corruption 
and misuse of public resources, and ineffective bureaucracy are looming rather large in 
Pakistan at present and are acting as a strong disincentive to both foreign and domestic 
private investment and have the effect of lowering economic growth. But to an extent, 
the present governance problems have their roots in the pattern of economic 
development over the last fifty years. The uneven distribution of growth benefits and 
increasing dualism in the society are reflected in the sharp contrast between the growing 
numbers of poor and illiterate, on the one hand, and increasing wealth and sophistication 
and wealth of the elite and the upper middle classes, on the other hand. The divergence 
in the life style  between the rich and the poor is to some extent unavoidable in the early 
stages of capitalist development. In Pakistan, however, this divergence has become 
especially pronounced in recent years as economic growth has slowed down, real wages 
have tended to fall and the incidence of poverty has tended to increase. Equally 
important, government policies which have neglected the social sectors and bestowed 
unearned benefits on industrialists and entrepreneurs have aggravated income 
disparities. It is not, therefore, entirely surprising that tensions within the society have 
3With an annual average growth of 4 percent per annum, it will take per capita GNP twenty eight 
years to treble. Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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grown over time and have begun to erupt with increasing frequency in ethnic, sectarian, 
and random violence. While an improvement in the law and order situation is necessary 
for stimulating growth, the pattern of future growth must also ensure that some of the 
underlying causes of tensions in the society, i.e., poverty, illiteracy, growing income 
disparities are removed or mitigated over time. As Pakistan looks to the future the 
growth and governance agendas appear to be intertwined .Without an improvement in 
the quality of governance and a reversal in the decline in public institutions it will be 
difficult to revive economic growth. But the challenge also is to ensure that  economic 
policies in the future will correct the imbalances of the past, seek to greater harmony in 
the society, and help deal with the governance issues such as corruption and law and 
order. The political leadership can also help to promote the much needed changes in 
values and attitudes by accepting the need for a rule based society in which hard work, 
thrift, innovation and merit are the criteria which guide both the civil service reform and 
the relations with the private sector. 
In the remaining part of this paper, I will abstract from the political governance 
issues except  to the extent that they are directly relevant to economic policy reform and 
implementation. Thus I will  focus mainly on the structural elements,  crucial economic 
policy actions and institutional issues which can help shape a better  future and end the 
economic drift of the 1990s, with GDP growth rate of less than 4 percent per annum, 
which has brought increasing  unrest, growing poverty and major financial difficulties. I 
will dwell on six aspects of economic management which appear crucial to me. These 
are (1) resolving the financial problems, (2) accelerating the demographic transition, (3) 
exploiting the tremendous agricultural potential, (4) accelerating the level of and 
improving the quality of education, (5) developing a new compact  with the private 
sector to increase competitiveness and bring about structural change in exports and 
industry, and (6) last but not least strengthening implementation at all levels of 
government thus creating a culture of  accountability and performance. 
 
RESTORING FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
The viability of all other long term policies will be vitiated if Pakistan does 
not restore financial equilibrium. Pakistan’s financial difficulties have several 
dimensions. First, notwithstanding some progress in the last two years, the 
underlying macro-imbalances remain large. Before the external debt relief, the fiscal 
deficit in 1998-99 was still 4.7 percent of GDP (3.4 percent after debt relief) 
compared to 6 and 5.4 percent respectively in 1996-97 and 1997-98. Furthermore, 
the fiscal deficit does not include the losses and potential losses of public sector 
corporations and banks. The estimated current account balance of payments deficit 
of $2.5 billion or 3.8 percent of GDP in 1998-99 was sustained only by extraordinary 
debt relief. Second, the reduction in the fiscal and balance of payments deficit during Parvez Hasan  37:4, 94 
the last two years have been brought about  mainly by reduction in the investment 
rate which seriously threatens the future growth of the economy. Thirdly, there is a 
correct perception in the press and in the public that the current agreement between 
Pakistan government and the IMF while helping to avoid default on external debt will at 
best provide only a breather from our difficult indeed dire economic and financial 
problems. The ability of the real economy to withstand progressive financial shocks has 
been greatly weakened and economic uncertainty is already playing havoc with 
investment and growth.  But the more fundamental point is that even with a successful 
implementation of the IMF assisted programme, the financial adjustment, both fiscal 
and external, will be far from complete by the middle of 2000. The final and related 
point is because both the domestic and external debt has risen to extraordinary heights; 
the bringing down of this debt burden to manageable levels is no simple matter and will 
take several years of sustained and disciplined fiscal and external resource management. 
 
DEBT OVERHANG 
According to my estimates, total public debt in mid 1999 was over Rs 2800 
billion (the external debt has been converted by using the latest exchange rate) and 
exceeded 95 percent of GDP. This ratio has risen from 60 percent of GDP in 1985 and 
80 percent in 1990.  The economic programme even if implemented aggressively over 
the next twelve months can at best bring down this ratio only marginally whereas the 
need is to reduce it to at least 70 percent of GDP if Pakistan wants to get out of the debt 
trap and indeed if it wants to get meaningful control of its economic policies which will 
inevitably be dictated by creditors as long as emergency infusions of external capital are 
needed. 
The government, therefore, needs to develop and the public and the press should 
debate the elements of a viable strategy of debt work out reduction over the medium 
term.  One must begin with outlining the nature of Pakistan debt problem and 
distinguish between related but nonetheless separate issues of external and internal debt. 
Till the late 1980s, the external debt of Pakistan was more or less manageable. In the 
1990s, the burden of external debt has grown because while current account balance of 
payments deficits increased (totalling $17 billion alone during the four years ending 
June 1988) exports have tended to stagnate in recent years and GDP growth slowed 
down.  The real depreciation of the currency in 1998 necessitated by the serious foreign 
exchange crisis has also increased the burden of external debt.  The ratio of foreign debt 
to GDP, after debt relief, in mid 1999 was approaching 60 percent (compared with 35 
percent in 1990) and the share of relatively short-term debt in the total has grown. As a 
percentage of foreign exchange earnings including remittances, Pakistan’s external debt 
is now close to 300 percent. The high external debt-service payments have meant that 
the gross annual external financing requirements reached the totally unsustainable level Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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of $9.5 billion during the last three years (1995–98). Even after annual average the 
accruals to resident foreign currency deposits of $1.2 billion, the requirements were far 
excess of normal sources of finance.  This is the background against which the debt re-
scheduling had to be sought from the London and the Paris clubs.  Clearly, Pakistan’s 
external payments difficulties were exacerbated by the imposition of sanctions but their 
root cause lies in the payments imbalances of the last few years and rather reckless 
reliance on financing these imbalances with short-term resident foreign currency 
deposits (RFCD) and other short-term borrowing. 
The foreign exchange crisis forced the balance of payments adjustment which 
has brought down the current account balance of payments deficit (before accruals to 
RFCD) from the peak of $5.3 billion in 1995-96 or 8 percent of GDP to $2.5 billion or 
3.8 percent of GDP in 1998-99. But clearly further reduction in external deficit will be 
necessary. In my view, it should be the goal of policy to reduce the deficit to around 2 
percent of GDP and to maintain it at that level in the foreseeable future or till such time 
that the ratio of external debt to GDP is brought back to reasonable level of say 40 
percent. 
The magnitude of external adjustment needed in Pakistan is as great as the fiscal 
adjustment which has been the focus of most previous IMF agreements. In the past, the 
balance of payments targets suggested by IMF were much less stringent than fiscal 
targets.  Indeed the relatively recent 1997 IMF agreement considered a current account 
balance of payments deficit (after accrual to RFCD) of 4 percent of GDP or roughly 6 
percent of GDP (before accrual to RFCD) quite feasible for 1997-98. Both the 
government and the IMF were too sanguine about the prospects of large additions to 
resident foreign currency deposits though it has been evident for some time that a major 
factor in their increase was the large implicit subsidy provided by the State Bank of 
Pakistan through foreign exchange risk cover at a rate much below the expected 
depreciation of the rupee.  The stagnation in export earnings since 1995 should have 
also sent up a cautionary signal about the desirability of large further increases in 
external obligations.  No doubt the government handling of IPPs has effected creditor 
confidence and made the roll over of short-term credit much more difficult. But 
fundamentally, Pakistan’s balance of payments position has been precarious for a 
number of years because not only were the deficit large but also the sizeable external 
inflows were short-term and not financing investment but rather sustaining consumption 
levels. 
Because the need for external adjustment was not foreseen by policy-makers and 
international institutions the adjustment that has taken place this past year has been 
disorderly reflected in sharp compression of imports.  Effects of this on investment level 
and medium term growth will be unavoidable. But as mentioned above, the balance of 
payments adjustment will need to go further to ensure a more self-reliant growth path. Parvez Hasan  37:4, 96 
Can the future adjustment necessary to put external finances on a sound footing and 
bringing Pakistan closer to a more self-reliant growth path be made without major 
disruptive effects on growth and investment? Certainly limiting the current account 
balance of payments deficit to around 2 percent of GDP during the next four or five 
years compared to 6-7 percent of GDP during the last five years will not be easy.  The 
impact on investment and growth will depend in large part on whether additional 
domestic savings can be mobilised for investment, whether exports expansion or import 
substitution (especially in food grains and edible oils) can help to ensure adequate 
availability of capital goods imports.  It will be desirable to obtain a greater degree of 
equilibrium in the balance of payments while protecting and if possible enhancing 
economic growth.  If a reduction in the balance of payments deficit is achieved mainly 
by a further reduction in the already low rate of investment (or further squeeze on social 
spending), the long term growth will suffer seriously.  The aim should be to increase 
domestic savings to make up for reduced foreign inflows.  But these domestic savings 
must also be translated into earnings or savings of foreign exchange. 
While export, agricultural and industrial policies have all a role to play in 
strengthening the balance of payments, the need for a realistic exchange rate remains 
paramount.  Unfortunately, devaluation remains an emotive issue for most Pakistanis, an 
evil forced on them by the IMF. By raising prices of foreign goods and other 
expenditures in foreign exchange such as travel and education, devaluation puts pressure 
on real consumption and investment.  But precisely because it succeeds in reducing real 
expenditures and switching of expenditures from foreign to domestic goods, devaluation 
helps the balance of payments positively.  It is true that devaluation does not always 
work especially if monetary and fiscal policies are not supportive.  But the types of 
arguments being frequently used in the debate on the exchange rate in Pakistan do not 
withstand close examination. 
For instance, it is argued that devaluation adds to inflationary pressure and 
therefore the hoped for competitive advantage is quickly eroded.  However, the cost 
push effects of devaluation through raising of import prices can be easily exaggerated. 
Imports at present account for only 15 percent of GDP.  Inflation in Pakistan is largely a 
monetary phenomenon driven by sizeable fiscal deficits.  Another argument is that in 
the short run the response of exports and imports may be limited because of non-price 
factors.  Certainly a significant part of the export problems facing Pakistan are structural 
and must be addressed by special measures. But it is not true that Pakistan’s experience 
suggests a low response to devaluation.  The relatively good export performance of the 
1980s owed a great deal to the large depreciation of real effective exchange rate after 
1982. In contrast, the nominal devaluations of the Rupee over 1990–97 merely 
compensated for the higher rate of inflation in Pakistan and there was no change in the 
real effective exchange rate. Given this and the serious structural problems facing Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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exports especially the heavy dependence on cotton based exports, it is not altogether 
surprising that exports have stagnated during the last three or four years.  Another 
argument against devaluation is that it negatively effects the fiscal situation because of 
the large burden of external debt.  Fortunately, the significant debt rescheduling from 
the Paris and London club of external debt payments in the current year and the next 
will prevent exchange rate adjustments from aggravating the fiscal position.  Finally, 
real devaluation does put pressure on real wages as it transfers income to exporters.  In 
Pakistan’s case the best long run guarantee for minimising the impact on the most 
vulnerable groups in the society will be the drive for self-sufficiency in wheat and edible 
oils which will indeed be helped by the exchange rate depreciation. 
To some extent the debate on the exchange rate has been overtaken by events. 
The effective unification of the various exchange rates through the market mechanism in 
the first half of 1999 has resulted in an exchange rate of Rs 51.5 per U.S. dollar 
compared to the rupee parity of  Rs 44 per U.S. dollar in May  1998. This means that, 
for the first time in the 1990s, there  has been a significant real exchange rate adjustment 
during 1998-99.  This real depreciation has been necessitated indeed forced by a change 
in Pakistan’s external circumstances and a delayed realisation both at the international 
and national level that past balance of payments were not sustainable.  Instead of this 
change being resisted, it should be welcomed as an important instrument for progress 
towards greater self-reliance.  Paradoxical though it may seem, a realistic value of the 
rupee and a reduction in the scarcity premium in the free market is more likely than 
anything else to reverse the capital flight which has been underway since the summer of 
1998.  For the future also, small adjustments in the nominal exchange rate if warranted 
by the differential of inflation rate between Pakistan and her major trading partners 
should be made more or less automatically or least on a regular basis so that the trauma 
of a major periodic adjustment can be avoided. 
External adjustment must go hand in hand with domestic financial adjustment. 
Among the economic issues, nothing is quite as critical as the need for raising the 
domestic saving rate.  The task of raising domestic savings is broader than the goal of 
reducing fiscal deficit, though the fiscal adjustment will certainly contribute to higher 
domestic savings.  Hemmed in by the IMF conditionality, however, fiscal adjustment 
has been viewed too narrowly. No doubt, Pakistan has run large and unsustainable fiscal 
deficits for a long time and violated close to dozen IMF agreements. But as mentioned 
above, much of the reduction in the fiscal deficit in recent years has been achieved 
through compression in expenditures. That squeezing of government expenditures in the 
1990s has already taken a heavy toll on development spending is well known.  But it is 
not widely recognised, that total real public spending (excluding interest) over 1991–98 
actually declined, falling from 20.6 to 14.9 as a percentage of GDP.  Over this period 
defence spending has dropped from 6.3 to 4.8 percent of GDP while development Parvez Hasan  37:4, 98 
spending fell from 6.4 to 3.2 percent of GDP. It is doubtful that social spending has 
risen significantly.  Indeed implementation of the Social Action Programme may be in 
jeopardy. Certainly adequate allocations are not being made for operation and 
maintenance expenditure. Since the size of the government and military establishment 
has not been reduced, the cuts in spending must be further hampering the effective 
delivery of services. No doubt there is a great deal of waste in government and 
substantial downsizing is warranted. But on the other hand, public pay is declining and 
development outlays are seriously under funded.  There is great danger that tough 
decisions on size of government payroll will be postponed while further cuts will be 
made in important discretionary spending reducing the effectiveness of government 
services further and increasing the resistance to tax collection by the public. 
Greater revenue mobilisation is of course the key to fiscal adjustment. As 
mentioned above, as a result of not very well thought out reduction in tax rates in March 
1997 and depressed imports the tax to GDP ratio, already low, fell to 13 percent in 
1997-98 notwithstanding the large windfall gain due to lower import prices of oil. The 
problem is not, however, simply that substantially higher revenues are needed but they 
must be mobilised with due regards to their incidence.  The strong negative reaction to 
the modest increase in general sales tax from 12.5 to 15 percent must be seen in this 
light.  
The major failing of the tax system is the total inadequacy of personal income tax 
collections which are around 10 percent of tax revenues or barely 1.3 percent of GDP. 
The sharp reduction in personal income tax rates has led to loss of revenue as it did not 
result in any greater compliance.  The tax base has remained very narrow.  For sake of 
both fairness and elasticity of the tax system, personal income taxation must be made 
more effective.  This is the single most important test of new Pakistan Revenue Service. 
But even under the best of circumstances the ratio of personal income tax to GDP will 
rise only slowly because the maximum rate has been reduced to 20 percent. It will be 
difficult to improve the redistribute effects of tax policies unless new steps are taken to 
tax the rich more effectively. 
Four measures which can yield additional revenue and improve redistribution 
while not effecting negatively the economic incentives and the level of domestic 
economic activity are capital gains taxation, estate taxes (death duties), the extension of 
income tax to global incomes and agricultural taxation.  First, Pakistan is one of the few 
countries that does not have a tax on capital gains.  The exemption from capital gains 
tax which was due to expire at the end of June 1997 was extended for another three 
years. Now that Pakistan has a low income tax rate there is no justification for 
exempting capital gains from the normal income tax; there can be some allowance (say 
25–50 percent) for the impact of inflation on assets held longer than five or ten years. 
The taxation of capital gains, which in real estate have been phenomenal in recent years, Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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will not only be socially just but will also tend to curb purely speculative investments 
and help direct investments to longer term productive uses. 
Second, large inherited wealth should also be subject to taxation in the interest of 
equity.  The introduction of progressive estate duties ranging from 10 to 30 percent on 
estates in excess of Rs 5 million could help to moderate the growing income disparities 
in the long run. In the short run, it will be an important political gesture for a 
government which faces the danger of being over-identified with business interests. 
Care has to be taken, however, that estate taxation is more effective than the present 
wealth taxation which yields relatively little revenue. 
Third, Pakistan should extend the coverage of income tax to income derived 
from all world sources.  Most countries tax the global income of their residents. Pakistan 
also did in the 1960s but tax on income from sources outside Pakistan was effectively 
diluted over time.  Now that maximum income tax has been lowered to 20 percent, there 
is even less justification for exempting any income from outside Pakistan sources from 
tax.  The present situation actually encourages residents to transfer savings and hold 
assets abroad and thus acts against domestic investment. But as in all tax administration, 
enforcement will be important.  
Fourth agricultural income tax must be made effective.  Dramatic increase in 
revenue from this source should not be expected but a working agricultural income tax 
is highly necessary to improve fairness, plug leakages in the tax system and increase the 
tax base of provincial governments. Alternatively, serious consideration should be given 
to the imposition of a land tax. (see the discussion below.) 
The broader issue is that greater freedom for the private sector and relatively low 
tax regime must be accompanied by fiscal responsibility and a reasonable degree of 
equity if the new capitalist orientation of the economy is to be made acceptable to the 
general public.  The tax system needs to be made more efficient as well as more 
equitable. 
The pre-occupation with reducing the persistently large fiscal deficits has 
obscured the need for increasing government savings which at present are substantially 
negative.  The problem with Pakistan’s fiscal deficits has been not only that they have 
been large but also that a significant part of them have been financing public 
consumption.  For nearly twenty five years, consolidated current public expenditures 
have exceeded public revenues.  The difference represents negative government savings 
which averaging about 2 percent of GDP have been a major factor in depressing 
national savings.  The situation is not getting any better.  During the last three fiscal 
years (1996–98) total government dissaving was Rs 185 billion or over 2.5 percent of 
GDP.  Fiscal choices must be debated in the context of turning government dissaving 
into a surplus of at least 2 percent of GDP.  This necessary and drastic shift must come 
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development spending.  But the scope for the latter is somewhat limited because 
possible further savings in defence will be offset by increases in social spending. 
In the short-run, the possibility of large external debt rescheduling offers the 
scope for retiring expensive domestic debt.  The commentary in the press that external 
debt re-scheduling will provide fiscal space is highly irresponsible.  The net effect of 
external debt re-scheduling will be to raise total outstanding external debt. The 
counterpart resources released, therefore, must be used for corresponding reduction in 
domestic debt.  If any part of them are used for expenditures, the total debt to GDP ratio 
will increase further.  But because the interest rate on domestic debt is substantially 
higher than on external debt, some relief will be available for the budget in the medium 
term.  Use of privatisation proceeds for retiring external and/or internal debt will also 
help to lower interest payments in the budget. 
 
Table 1 
Two Scenarios of Economic and Financial Adjustment Figures as Percent of GDP 





GDP Growth  4.6  5.4  3.1  4.0
1 5.0 
Investment 18.1  17.2  14.9  16.0  16.8 
National Savings  13.6  12.0  11.1  14.0  14.8 
Foreign Savings
2 4.5  5.4  3.8  2.0  2.0 
Public Savings
3 –0.6  –2.0  –1.7  0.5  2.0 
Private Savings  14.2  14.0  12.6  13.5  12.8 
Government Revenues  18.6  16.0  16.5  17.5  19.0 
Tax Revenues  14.0  13.0  12.0  14.5  15.5 
Total Public Spending  25.7  21.5  21.2  21.0  22.0 
Defence 6.8  4.8  4.5  4.0  3.8 
Interest 5.4  6.9  7.0  5.7  5.6 
General  Administration 1.4 1.4  1.3 1.3  1.3 
Other Non-Development  5.6  5.4  5.4  6.0  6.3 
Development 6.5  3.0  3.0  4.0  5.0 
Fiscal Deficit  6.5  5.5  4.7  3.5  3.0 
Sources: Economic Survey 1997-98 and author’s estimates and assumptions. The marginal saving rate is 
assumed at 20 percent in the scenario A and 25 percent in scenario B. See also footnote 8. 
1The GDP growth rates figures in both scenarios A and B are assumptions relating to the five year 
period 1999-2000 to 2003-4. 
2Defined as current account balance of payments deficit. 
3Defined as excess of consolidated public revenues over current expenditures. Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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While the precise nature of fiscal adjustment can and must be debated i.e. scope 
for raising taxation, reducing defence spending, retiring debt, funding social 
expenditures, these should be no ambiguity about two medium term fiscal goals: 
significantly positive government savings and a sharply lower debt to GDP ratio. 
Whatever the pattern of fiscal adjustment, it will be painful. 
But provided government savings can swing from a negative 2 percent of GDP to 
a positive 2 percent, the domestic savings picture will improve dramatically. Control of 
government finances will increase confidence in currency, reduce the need for periodic 
devaluations and create conditions for reversal of capital flight. The present domestic 
saving rate of 12-13 of GDP is only half the rate in India.  Pakistan’s economic survival 
may depend on narrowing this gap. 
The above Table 1 illustrates the tough financial choices Pakistan faces. Both 
scenarios assume that the reduction in the ratio of national debt to GDP will be given a 
very high priority and thus the fiscal and the current account balance of payments 
deficits deficit will be maintained at 3.0-3.5  and 2 percent of GDP  respectively during 
1998-2003 as a policy variable. Total public spending remains greatly constrained and 
does not much exceed the low relative level reached in 1997-98 even in the high growth 
scenario B. Even then, the ratio of debt to GDP will drop only moderately from 97 in 
mid 1999 to 78  in mid 2004 and the ratio of foreign debt to GDP will remain close to 
50.
4 This ratio could be further reduced to around 70, the minimum desired level, if 
sizeable privatisation revenues accrue to the government and are earmarked for debt 
reduction. 
The scenarios bring out the central importance of increasing public 
savings. Positive public savings are essential for raising the very inadequate 
level of development spending. As we discussed above, the scope for reducing 
current expenditures is relatively limited. As it is, it has been assumed that real 
absolute level of defence spending will rise only marginally in the next few 
years. Savings from reduced interest payments, resulting from a declining debt to 
GDP ratio will be largely offset by the needs of higher social sector spending. 
The success of Pakistan’s fiscal adjustment will depend critically on whether  the 
government can tax the well to do and the rich through direct taxation. But even 
in the higher growth, higher taxation and higher development spending scenario, 
the investment rate will in 2004 remain well below the average level in the 1990s 
mainly because of the constraint on foreign borrowing. Investment resources 
should thus be spent very carefully and growth enhancing efficiency 
improvements, discussed below, will be critically important. 
4The analysis behind these calculations makes the further assumptions of 8 percent domestic 
inflation and an average devaluation of 6 percent per annum to compensate for the difference between 
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MANAGING THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
The factor which provides the greatest source of my relative optimism about the 
long term future is the slowing population growth and the possibility that through 
aggressive policy actions aimed especially at female education and supporting health 
and family planning services, the decline in the rate of this growth can be accelerated. 
The preliminary results of 1998 census suggest that population has grown at an 
annual rate of 2.6 percent per annum since 1981 and is estimated to be growing 
currently at an annual rate of 2–2.2 percent per annum now.
5 This suggests that the 
demographic transition has already begun in Pakistan though both the fertility rate and 
natural rate of growth of population remain substantially higher than both India and 
Bangladesh: the current population growth rate in India and Bangladesh is estimated at 
1.5 and 1.3 percent respectively and their total fertility rate is around 3 compared with 
4.8 in Pakistan. Since the total fertility rate in Pakistan, though declining, is still quite 
high, the future demographic trends can be strongly influenced by policy measures in 
education, health, and family planning. A paramount need is to strengthen policies 
especially female education and literacy so as to reduce desired family size. Reflecting 
the high rates of illiteracy among women (75 percent) and low rate of participation of 
women in the labour force (less than 15 percent), the desired number of children in 
Pakistan is still 4 compared to only 2 in Bangladesh.
6 A dramatic improvement in 
women’s education and status in society will help to lower the desired family size and 
thus increase the demand for family planning services. But even at present there is 
substantial unmet demand for family planning services. The number of currently 
married women that are users of contraceptives has risen from 12 to 24 percent over 
1991–98 [NIPS (1998)]. Still the unmet need for family planning (both spacing and 
limiting) is estimated is high. Only 39 percent of the total  demand for family planning 
is satisfied. [NIPS (1998), p. 47.] There remains substantial scope  for expansion of 
family planning services even with the present attitudes towards family size. 
Learning from the experience of Bangladesh, public policy should set the 
ambitions goals of achieving replacement level fertility over the next twenty five years. 
The effective implementation of the second phase of the Social Action Programme 
(SAP) 1997–2002 will be an important first step towards the achievement of this goal. If 
total fertility rate can be reduced to 2 by 2025, the annual population growth will drop to 
around 1 percent. This suggests that  with proper policies there are good prospects of  
limiting the annual average growth rate of population to around 1.5 percent  during the 
next twenty five years. Even this rate of growth will be very much higher than what is 
likely in India and Bangladesh. 
5This analysis is based on discussion with Sultan Hashmi, a Pakistan authority on demographic trends. 
6These numbers were quoted by Attiya Inayatullah, a leading figure in family planning in 
Pakistan, at a conference held at the Human Development Centre in Islamabad in April 1997. Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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In any event, Pakistan population growth rate is likely to be dramatically lower 
over the next quarter century than in the past twenty five years when it averaged close to 
3 percent per annum. In the past, the very high population growth has meant great 
pressures on social services (especially education) and has adversely affected domestic 
resource mobilisation, poverty alleviation and income distribution. A sharp reduction in 
the population growth rate in coming decades will ease both pressures on financial 
resources and help a better distribution of growth benefits by contributing to the gradual 
tightening of the labour market, though the effects of the slowing population growth rate 
on the rate of labour force growth and thus need very high employment growth will not 
be significant for at least a decade. An annual population growth rate of 1.5 percent over 
2000–25 will also mean that an annual GDP growth of around 5.5 percent will be 
sufficient to achieve  the economic goal  of roughly trebling per capita GNP in twenty 
five to thirty years  suggested above.
7 
 
IMPROVING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY 
Agriculture has been a bright spot in Pakistan’s economic performance since the 
1960s. The average agricultural growth rate of nearly 4 percent annually over nearly 
four decades has been exceeded internationally, among large countries, only by 
Malaysia and Thailand [Hasan (1998)]. The trend has been maintained in the 1990s 
despite the setbacks in cotton production. It has been argued that the agricultural growth 
could have been even higher in the 1970s and 1980s if the government price 
interventions had, on the whole not depressed the prices received by the farmers 
[Hamid, Nabi and Nasim (1990)].  
Substantial potential for agricultural growth still exists because a large part of the 
increase in agricultural output in the past has come from enormous increases in 
availability of inputs, especially water and fertiliser. On the demand side the 
substantial scope for import substitutions in wheat and edible oil will help overcome the 
constraint from slow growing economy. The improvements in efficiency have been 
relatively limited and irrigated yields per hectare have shown only modest increases 
over long periods. The important exceptions were the dramatic increase in cotton 
yields during the 1980s and wheat and rice yield improvements in the second half of 
the 1960s.  
Pakistan’s reliance on an extensive pattern of development in agriculture 
becomes clear from large increase in water availability of over 3 percent per annum 
during the three decades 1960–90 attributable both to the extensive use of private 
tube-wells to exploit ground water resources and large public investments in water 
storage and irrigation. The construction of Mangla and Tarbela Dams and the large-
scale Indus Basin replacement works in the 1960s and early 1970s not only reduced 
7See footnote 3 in Table 1.  Parvez Hasan  37:4, 104
the variability in water availability but also added to total supplies from the irrigation 
system. 
Sustainability of past pattern of agricultural growth is in serious doubt because 
Pakistan cannot expect major increases in water availability in the foreseeable future. 
No investments in storage of water are underway at the moment and, in any case, 
large projects like Kalabagh Dam would take a decade to complete once initiated. 
Ground water development through private tube-wells may be reaching a saturation 
point. Future agricultural growth will have to come from improving the efficient use 
of major inputs such as water and fertiliser as well as greater agricultural 
diversification. 
What can the state do to promote productivity growth and better allocation 
within agriculture?
8 
In terms of incentives, there is still moderate negative effective protection for 
wheat and very high positive protection for sugarcane. The continuation of support 
prices for wheat, cotton and rice makes some sense because the system does, by and 
large, work. In case of smaller crops the price supports are not effective. In the case 
of sugarcane the government intervention is definitely harmful to national interests 
and serves mainly the interests of sugar mills. A dismantling of the entire system of 
sugarcane supports, at least as national policy, will improve efficiency of resource 
use in agriculture though it will meet tough resistance from vested interests  
More effective use of water resources would require substantial increases in 
water charges, coupled with investments in improvement of delivery, efficiency of  
irrigation, and appropriate on-farm investments in land levelling, etc. At present, 
water charges cover less than 50 percent of operations and maintenance costs of 
irrigation system, let alone recovery of capital cost. Thus, there are insufficient 
incentives to conserve water and undertake on-farm investments. A sharp increase in 
water charges and an earmarking of these additional funds for better maintenance of 
canals will have a high economic pay-off.  
There are serious problems with the quality of inputs especially seed and 
pesticides distributed by the private sector. This is an ideal area where more effective 
government regulation will be helpful. 
Last but not least, improvement in the technical efficiency with which 
agricultural inputs are used would also require strengthening of human resource base 
in agriculture. Low rate of literacy and low levels of education are a major drag on 
agricultural productivity. 
The two  broader issues relating to agriculture i.e. land reform and agricultural 
taxation need also to be mentioned. Land reform, however, desirable from the point 
of view of longer term productivity and equity in agriculture is simply not likely to 
8In making the following suggestions, I have benefited from a discussion with Shafi Niaz, a well- 
known expert on agricultural policies in Pakistan. Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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happen because of current political realities and the power of landed interests. 
Pakistan’s experience under the last two land reforms also is not very encouraging in 
terms of land that could actually be release for redistribution. It is, therefore, more 
fruitful for public policy to focus on the issues of agricultural taxation. If income 
taxation of agriculture, which is a provincial subject, cannot be made effective and 
chances are that it cannot be the Federal government must give serious consideration 
to the imposition of a sizeable land tax on all holdings above 25 acres both to 
mobilise revenue and to force a more efficient use of land resources under large 
holdings. Strong discrimination in favour of small and medium scale farmers in the 
provision of credit will also further the interests of equity and growth. 
 
REMEDYING THE PAST NEGLECT OF EDUCATION 
Pakistan has seriously neglected investment in human capital and  has paid the 
price for it not only in persistently high population growth for a long period but also 
slowing rate of growth. As a result of slow progress in education especially basic 
education, the adult literacy rate is only 37 percent  and the illiteracy among women 
is as high as 75 percent. Current gross primary  enrolment ratio of about two-thirds 
compares unfavourably with both India and Bangladesh. Furthermore, the quality of 
primary education is extremely unsatisfactory. Drop out rates are high and among 
those who complete primary school less than half can actually read, write, and do 
arithmetic. The low level of literacy is a major drag on modernisation of agriculture 
and industry and a constraint on the efforts to reduce population growth. 
To exploit fully the elements of Pakistan’s long term economic strength 
mentioned above (a declining population growth rate and greatly underutilised 
agricultural potential) a much greater commitment to human development and much 
more effective public interventions in education are required. Remedying the past 
neglect of education is an important goal in itself but has become absolutely critical 
in the context of global economic challenges of an information age. 
There has been a notable acceleration in primary enrolments and a substantial 
narrowing of the gender gap in basic education during the last decade and policy 
actions and investment allocations have become more focused as a result of SAPI 
(1994–98). But as the stories about ghost schools and phantom teachers suggest, 
there are substantial leakages from the expenditures. More generally, the government 
does not recognises the financial, management and institutional capacity constraints 
which stand in the way of expanding and improving the quality of education. It 
therefore, does not appear to be ready to deal with them forcefully and once again 
the goals may be frustrated. For instance, the new education policy has set the totally 
unrealistic target of raising the present 2.2 percent allocation of GDP for education to 
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7 percent per annum over 1998–2003. The 20 percent annual growth in real 
education spending is totally beyond reach because of fiscal problems and slow 
growing economy. 
Fortunately, at least elementary education (up to grade 8) requires relatively 
modest resources: the present spending on elementary education is only 1.3 percent 
of GDP. A growth in real spending of 8-9 percent annually on elementary education 
will be sufficient to meet the goal of universal primary education in ten years.
9 This 
will require only a modest increase of 0.5 percent of GDP in public spending on 
elementary education.
10 
The organisational and management problems in basic education are much 
more critical than the mobilisation of additional resources. The present policies have 
four major weaknesses: a centralist bias, overemphasis on buildings on buildings, 
overloading of the curriculum and last but not least lack of continuity and high 
professional excellence of managers in education. The experience with SAP I clearly 
indicates that the efficiency of resource use remains a major problem. A better 
balance between the recurrent expenditures (teachers’ salaries, text books, and 
teaching aids) non-recurrent spending (buildings and equipment), rationalisation of 
staff deployment, adjustment of teachers’ staffing to changes in enrolment, reduction 
in teacher absenteeism can go a long way in improving the effectiveness of public 
education spending at all levels. But these necessary improvements can be achieved 
only with a high degree of political commitment and excellence and continuity of 
administrative leadership in education, the two conditions which are not met yet. 
Increasing the basic level of education, improving its quality and, increasing 
literacy are the most urgent social goals. But Pakistan cannot ignore the problems 
with the higher level of education which remain the key constraint on development 
of new industries such as electronics and information technology. Improvement in 
the coverage and quality of higher education requires a three-pronged attack: further 
development of institutions of excellence; greater autonomy and/or privatisation of 
public institutions, especially beyond the secondary level; and increasing effective 
competition between the private and public sectors in provision of education beyond 
the middle school level. There are a few institutions of higher learning in Pakistan 
which have attained international standards and acceptance. But their number is 
woefully inadequate and their impact on the society is rather limited. Government 
should remove obstacles in the way of development of further private universities 
and should give them some preference in the allocation of land. The management 
load on public sector education is generally extremely heavy. There is no reason why 
in the spirit of decentralisation financially viable or potentially viable public sector 
9See footnote 3 above. 
10It is assumed that annual GDP growth over the next decade will average a modest 5 percent. Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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colleges should not be made autonomous or turned over to non-profit NGOs. This 
will ensure greater community involvement as well assist in mobilisation of 
resources for the future. Finally, there is little effective competition between the 
educational institutions in the private and public sectors. Public sector institutions 
charge extremely low fees and provide low quality education. Private colleges and 
universities, on the other hand, assure a minimum quality of education but charge 
fees which can be hundred times that of public sector institutions. Under the present 
circumstances, there may be an element of monopoly rent enjoyed by many private 
educational institutions, especially those run on commercial lines. Raising both the 
level of fees and the quality of education in the public sector institutions will help to 
increase the competition between the public and private sectors. Greater efficiencies 
in both sectors would help lower the present high cost of private education. 
 
DEFINING A NEW COMPACT WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Perhaps for the first time in Pakistan’s history there is a clear consensus 
within the government that the private sector is pivotal for development because the 
state sector is seriously over extended financially, has become increasingly 
inefficient and cannot provide the effective leadership for modernisation of the 
economy. While increased public investment in physical infrastructure and human 
capital will be needed it is private sector investment (both domestic and foreign) 
which will be the engine of growth. But there is much less recognition both within 
the government and the private sector that a well-defined new framework is needed 
for long term cooperation between the public and private sectors. Indeed, just as in 
the past, the private sector appears to have been pre-occupied in obtaining tax and 
other concessions from the government to revive industrial capacity, which may no 
longer be economic. Meanwhile the government has been pushing ahead with 
privatisation, financial sector reform, and export and tax policy changes, many of the 
elements needed for a re-invigorated private sector but without defining the latter’s 
new responsibilities. 
In our view a new compact needs to make it explicit that private sector 
performance will be judged not only by the expansion in output and exports but also 
by its contribution to savings, creation of jobs, tax revenues and the modernisation of 
the economy.  The present private sector appears to be ill equipped to think in 
strategic terms and paradoxically may need help from and a dialogue with the 
government to develop the necessary capabilities and remove constraints. In the 
short to medium term the private and public sectors need to work jointly on defining 
and agreeing on policy goals and strategies in areas such as export development, 
modernisation of agriculture and industry, skills development, legal and regulatory 
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and capital markets. Hopefully in due course the private sector will gather strength 
and sophistication and the state role in economic areas can be limited to setting broad 
directions of policy, macro-economic management, and all forms of regulation 
(including utilities, environmental and financial regulation). 
For the near future the public and the private sector need to develop a new 
partnership to foster the country’s economic and social goals. This will not be easy 
given the past history of public sector mistrust of the private sector and private sector 
heavy reliance on the patronage of the government for subsidies and economic rents. 
What is required is a change in the mindset on both sides so that an effective new 
relationship can evolve. The Nawaz Sharif Government with its pro business bias has 
excellent credentials for setting the tone of the new relationship but it needs to make 
sure that the private sector clearly understands that the strong policy and institutional 
support for its activities will have to be balanced with a new respect for and 
conformance to tax laws and financial, environmental, and other regulation. Also, 
though the private sector cannot be formally held responsible for the social goals 
such as adequate job creation, skills development, and environmentally friendly 
growth, it must recognise that the range of economic freedoms it will like to enjoy 
will endure only if the society can deliver sustained and equitable growth. A 
backlash from unbridled capitalism cannot be ruled out in Pakistan. There need not 
be any major conflict between national objectives and self-interest of the private 
sector in the long run. But in the past the private sector in Pakistan has been 
excessively concerned with short run profitability. This has been partly the result of 
political instability and unpredictability of policies but the private sector has also not 
always concerned itself with structural problems or long term possibilities. The 
present circumstances present a unique opportunity to make a new beginning.  
Liberal economic policies, which  are a central element of a new framework 
for the private sector are largely already in place. But the experience of the 1990s 
suggests that the domestic private sector has moved slowly to bring about structural 
changes in industry and exports, has increased relative dependence on borrowing to 
finance investments, and has continued to look to state patronage to make easy 
profits [Hasan (1998)]. Hopefully this will change with a clearer articulation of the 
new relationship between the state and the private sector.  However, more direct 
attention should also be paid to the issues, which may stand in the way of rapid 
modernisation of both agriculture and industry. One factor, which could hold back 
progress towards rapid development of labour intensive, manufactured goods exports 
is the present built in bias against large-scale production. Modern sector industrial 
employment has grown little during the last few decades. Large scale production is 
not necessarily superior to small scale operations but in Pakistan’s case the flight 
from large scale industry has not been triggered by efficiency considerations but Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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rather has been motivated by the desire to evade labour and other regulations which 
were perceived to have become excessively stringent. In the process not only tax 
collection but also productivity and quality control have suffered hampering exports. 
There is urgently need for analysis and review which will remove any policy 
obstacles in the way of expansion of the large scale sector. Such a review of the 
regulatory framework should include small and medium scale industries which also 
remains excessively regulated. 
In terms of broad regulation and control of the private sector, three critical 
areas are banking sector, the capital markets, and tax administration. In the area of 
financial and capital markets regulation, the Nawaz Sharif government has followed 
the lead of the caretaker government and greatly increased the independence of the 
State Bank of Pakistan in formulating monetary policy and strengthened its powers 
for control and regulation of the financial institutions and has created an independent 
Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee joint stock companies and the 
capital markets institutions such as the stock exchanges. Meanwhile, the new 
managements of remaining state owned commercial banks have been charged to 
prepare them for speedy privatisation. Hopefully a financial system which is largely 
private owned but strongly regulated by the central bank will accelerate the 
mobilisation of financial savings and improve the allocation of credit by cutting costs 
of financial intermediation and reducing bank losses resulting from politically 
motivated lending. But a change in the financial system will also require a change in 
culture which can only be brought out gradually. The State Bank of Pakistan will 
have a crucial leadership role in creating this new culture of independence with 
accountability in the financial sector because of its large regulatory authority. 
Similarly the new Securities and Exchange Commission can through the exercise of 
its regulatory authority can help to increase confidence in the functioning of joint 
stock companies and capital market institutions and thus help direct savings to the 
modern sector. A strong and  politically independent tax authority should be the third 
institutional pillar of the regulation of the private sector. Such an authority, by fair 
but forceful implementation of tax laws and policy, can not only ensure a steady 
revenue growth but can through increased insistence on documentation and reduced 
tax evasion help promote a greater measure of trust in the accounts (balance sheets 
and profit and loss statements) of the domestic companies thus further supporting the 
processes of effective mobilisation and use of domestic savings. 
 
FOCUSING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
A measure of agreement on broad priorities, discussed above, already exists 
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path because there remains a great a lack of realism on growth, savings and 
investment targets. But even an agreement in principle on reform in key areas such 
as education, family planning, and tax administration is not very meaningful without 
a forceful implementation of the reform programme. In Pakistan failures of plan and 
programme implementation have been frequent and even more serious than policy 
failures. How can implementation and monitoring be made more effective in the 
future especially in areas such as education and tax administration? 
First and foremost there must be the political will to stay the course of 
unpopular and painful economic decisions. However, this political will cannot exist 
without a broad national consensus on economic and social priorities. This will 
require that public leaders take the public in confidence, educate them about 
economic realities and assure them that the costs of adjustments will not be 
disproportionately placed on the lower income groups. It also requires that economic 
adjustment programmes enjoy bi-partisan support and difficult economic issues such 
as downsizing of government adjustments of administered prices and tightening of 
tax administration are not unduly exploited for political purposes. 
Second, public institutions dealing with development must be given new 
respect and authority. The measures to reduce corruption and enforce accountability 
must not be allowed to further undermine the morale of honest and hardworking civil 
servants. Reduced political interference in day to day administration of public bodies 
can go a long way in improving their effectiveness. 
Third, the analytical capacity to examine policy options and monitor progress 
must be strengthened across the board, in public and private sectors, universities, and 
research institutes. Pakistan has not developed strong traditions of academic freedom 
and excellence. The economic and social reform agenda was driven excessively by 
international agencies and their research financing during the last decade. As a result, 
continuity in analytical work was not assured, domestic ownership of the 
programmes remained weak and the task of public education was not given must 
attention. In the age of globalisation and rapid technological change, the transfer of 
ideas and learning from experience abroad have become increasingly important. 
However, the quick assimilation of international experience and effective utilisation 
of foreign advice can be done only if the indigenous research and policy institutions 
are strong and independent. At present, the development of adequate analytical 
capacity in economic and social fields is either seriously hindered by lack of 
resources or driven largely by foreign funding. Just as in physical investments, 
Pakistan needs both to raise the level of investments in intellectual, research and 
policy endeavours and become more self-sufficient in financing them. Policy reform 
is an ongoing process which requires close monitoring and frequent adjustments. 
Without a strong analytical base in domestic institutions, Pakistan’s reform drive will 
not have strong chances of success. Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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Fourth, the balance of government effort between planning and goal-setting, 
on the one hand, and monitoring and implementation on the other, needs to be tilted 
in favour of the latter. At present, there is excessive preoccupation with goal-setting 
and the little attention is being given to effective follow up, redressal, and course 
adjustment. Enormous amount of energies continue to be devoted to the preparation 
of five-year plans and related documents and not enough resources are available to 
ensure that implementation problems are solved in a timely fashion. After more than 
forty years of five-year plans, the credibility of the planning processes is low not 
only in the public but also in the bureaucracy. Successive plans have clearly not 
succeeded in solving deep-rooted structural problems. In order to restore the 
credibility of planning mechanisms and government goals, it is essential to adopt 
realistic targets and to focus the implementation efforts on critical policy areas such 
as savings, exports, education, and population control where policy failures have 
been endemic. 
Finally, on the institutional front progress will be closely tied to the resolution 
of governance issues. Civil service reforms, steps to curb corruption, and 
decentralisation efforts will all contribute to increasing the efficiency of public 
servants while reducing the leakage of public funds and waste of public resources. 
Improving the effectiveness of the use of public resources will  in turn make a direct 




Pakistan’s economic crisis is much more deep seated than the government 
appears willing to admit. Both the structural and the financial problems have been 
building up for a long time. The heavy burden of debt, reflected in the debt to GDP 
ratio of nearly 100 percent, the low level of educational attainments, and major 
weaknesses in the structure of industry and exports are problems which will continue 
to influence economic prospects adversely for a number of years. 
The gravity of these problems must be recognised by policy-makers and it 
should be realised that there are no quick fixes to the predicament in which Pakistan 
finds itself. The government undercuts its own credibility both at home and abroad 
when it promises a quick and relatively painless economic turn around because the 
nature of economic difficulties i.e. unsustainable level of dependence on external 
resources, an inequitable pattern of growth, neglect of longer term investments in 
human and physical capital, and broad institutional decline are widely known and 
understood. 
Pakistan needs a longer term economic vision not only to deal effectively and 
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which will shape a better and more equitable economic future. But it also needs to 
come to terms with its past of missed opportunities and inequitable pattern of 
growth. It also has to brace itself for a difficult period of economic and financial 
adjustment.  
If short term costs are accepted by the society and political governance can be 
improved, two big ifs,  it would be quite feasible for Pakistan to achieve per capita 
GNP growth of 4 percent per annum over the next twenty five years, double the 
average rate in the last half century, and combine it with a better distribution of 
growth benefits.  
No long term economic policies will work if Pakistan does not restore 
financial equilibrium. The reduction of the ratio of national debt to GDP from nearly 
100 to around 70 percent over the next five years needs to be made  a top  national 
priority. This will mean keeping fiscal and  current account balance of payments 
deficits to  very low levels at least till 2005 and overall investment rate is likely to 
stagnate. Whether the fiscal and balance of payments adjustment  can be made 
consistent with longer term goals and reasonable GDP growth in the medium term  
will depend on three things, the ability of the tax system to mobilise  large additional 
resources through direct and expenditure taxation,  the greater effectiveness in the 
use of resources in the public sector and the ability of the industrial sector to use the  
substantial real exchange rate adjustment in 1998-99 for diversifying and expanding 
exports. The form of fiscal and balance of payment adjustment will be as important 
as the reduction in deficits. Fiscal deficit reduction should not come at the cost of 
development spending. Thus, a dramatic improvement in public savings is needed 
(from a negative 2 percent of GDP to a positive 2 percent over the next few years) 
and this can happen only with a sharp improvement in the tax: GDP ratio and 
continued restraint on defence spending. Similarly, the containment of balance of 
payments deficit, will prove consistent with increase in imports and recovery in 
growth only if  exports expand. 
Declining population growth rate, which is likely (with strongly supportive 
policies) to  average 1.5 percent annually over 2000–25, almost half the rate of the 
last twenty five years and the considerable potential  for improving factor 
productivity in agriculture (which in the past has relied heavily on increasing 
supplies of irrigated water and fertiliser) are two fundamental reasons for my 
optimism. 
The success in agriculture, family planning as well as modernisation and 
diversification of exports and industry will depend critically on investments in 
education. Plan for the education sector need to show greater financial realism and 
much more awareness of the serious problems with the quality of education at all 
levels. While resources for elementary education should be found at all cost to Shaping Pakistan’s Economic Future 
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ensure speedy attainment of universal primary  education, the managerial problems 
are even more serious even at the basic education level. 
Increasing the basic level of education, improving its quality and, increasing 
literacy are the most urgent social goals. But Pakistan cannot ignore the problems 
with the higher level of education which remain the key constraint on development 
of new industries such as electronics and information technology. Improvement in 
the coverage and quality of higher education requires a three-pronged attack: further 
development of institutions of excellence; greater autonomy and/or privatisation of 
public institutions, especially beyond the secondary level; and increasing effective 
competition between the private and public sectors in provision of education beyond 
the middle school level. 
Liberal economic policies, which  are a central element of a new framework 
for the private sector are largely already in place. But the experience of the 1990s 
suggests that the domestic private sector has moved slowly to bring about structural 
changes in industry and exports, has increased relative dependence on borrowing to 
finance investments, and has continued to look to state patronage to make easy 
profits. The present private sector appears to be ill equipped to think in strategic 
terms and paradoxically may need help from and a dialogue with the government to 
develop the necessary capabilities and remove constraints. In the short to medium 
term the private and public sectors need to work jointly on defining and agreeing on 
policy goals and strategies in areas such as export development, modernisation of 
agriculture and industry, skills development, legal and regulatory framework, an 
effective and elastic tax system and development of financial sector and capital 
markets. 
Effective management and implementation of policies is even more important 
than plans as such. In Pakistan failures of plan and programme implementation have 
been frequent and even more serious than policy failures. Unless implementation and 
monitoring can be made more effective in the future especially in areas such as 
education and tax administration, there cannot be much hope for achieving economic 
goals, however sensible. This requires progress on the institutional front which is 
closely tied to the resolution of governance issues; civil service reforms, steps to 
curb corruption, and decentralisation efforts will all contribute to increasing the 
efficiency of public servants while reducing the leakage of public funds and wastage 
of public resources 
The final point is that while  future policies need to focus  both on growth and 
distribution issues, many economic and social policies  can have a positive impact on 
both growth and distribution and good results  can often be mutually reinforcing. The 
reduction of population growth will increase per capita income growth, reduce 
poverty and help future growth through its positive impact on savings. Investments Parvez Hasan  37:4, 114
in human capital (especially the education of women) will contribute to slowing 
population growth, will have salutary effects on growth and exports (through raising 
productivity), and will help poverty alleviation by reducing the number of dependent 
children. Financial sector reform will stimulate savings and improve the allocative 
efficiency but also will prevent the abuse of the credit system which bestowed 
unearned benefits on those with preferred access. Better tax policies and 
administration will help resource mobilisation but through creating a fair and elastic 
tax system can provide the underpinnings of a much-needed expansion in social 
expenditures and also contribute to moderating income disparities. Exports of labour 
intensive manufactured goods will create jobs, increase export earnings, help growth 
and reduce reliance on foreign capital. 
If the Pakistan elite and politicians manage to do a better job of political 
governance and economic management in the first two decades of the 21st century than 
in the last half century, the past policy mistakes can be written off to experience.  
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